

Conceptualizing Resource Security Sector Reform (RSSR): an Approach to reform Resource Sector and Conflict Mitigation in Africa Mineral Sector

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Abstract

This paper is conceptual proposal, aims to undertake the issue of insufficiency of resource governance and insecurity situation in mineral sector in selected African counties, through identifying the relationship between mal-development, poverty and poor governance and lacking resource management in a resource-rich country. It argues that to mitigate insecurity condition (e.g. violent conflicts) relates to mineral resources, a reform on resource and governance sectors is perquisites. However, a conceptual model entitled Resource Security Sector Reform RSSR is proposed to address such issue. Content analysis is used to analyze a body of data that contains a body of literature related to resource governance, security and conflict. The paper shows that, to secure efficient resource governance and optimal utilization of available resources and their generated wealth in one country, structural and functional reform drawing from multi-levels governance and public sector reform that relates to resource security is essential to reach optimal resource governance in a resource-rich country. Moreover, provisions of constitutional, institutional and regulations reform remain key factors to empower distribution of power and wealth between the centre and regions, and also prerequisites for putting an end to major root- cause of civil political conflict in current Africa through peaceful means. This work contributes to knowledge as it deepens the understanding and advance current debate on the relationship between resource conflict, political security and conflict management in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan countries.

Key words: Resource sector, Governance, Security and Conflict,

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مستخلص:

هذه الورقة أطروحة مفاهيمية، تهدف لمعالجة قضايا عدم كفاية إدارة الموارد الطبيعية وحالة عدم الأمن في قطاع الموارد المعدنية في عدد من الأقطار الإفريقية، وذلك عبر التعريف بالعلاقة بين عدم التوازن التنموي، الفقر وضعف نظام الحكم وعدم فعالية إدارة الموارد الطبيعية في القطر الغنى بالموارد الطبيعية في القارة. تستند الورقة على حجة رئيسية مفادها: للحد من حالة عدم الأمن والاستقرار (مثال: الصراعات)، المرتبطة بالموارد الطبيعية، هنالك ضرورة لإصلاح قطاعي الموارد والحكم في دول إفريقيا الغنية بالموارد. لذلك تم طرح نموذج (إصلاح قطاع أمن الموارد)، كإطار مفاهيمي لمعالجة قضية العلاقة بين الموارد المعدنية وحالة عدم الأمن في القارة. استخدمت الورقة منهج تحليل المضمون/المحتوى، لتحليل المعلومات المجمعة من الأدبيات ذات الصلة بإدارة الموارد، الأمن والصراع. خلصت الورقة إلى الآتي: لإيجاد إدارة فاعلة للموارد الطبيعية، وتوزيع أفضل للثروة المتراكمة منها في القطر الغنى بالموارد، هنالك أولية لوجود إصلاحات بنيوية ووظيفية ناتجة عن تأسيس نظم الحكم متعدد المستويات والإصلاح في قطاع المؤسسات العامة المرتبطة بأمن الموارد الطبيعية. أيضا إصلاح السياسات، القوانين والمؤسسات في القطر المعنى، تعتبر عوامل رئيسية لتوزيع الثروة والسلطة بين المركز والأقاليم وأيضا أولية لمعالجة كثير من أسباب الصراعات الدائرة في إفريقيا بالطرق السلمية. تتمثل المساهمة العلمية لهذه الورقة، في إنها عملت على تعميق الفهم وتطوير الحوار حول العلاقة بين صراع الموارد، الأمن السياسي وإدارة الصراع في إفريقيا، خاصة في دول إفريقيا جنوب الصحراء.

Introduction

This paper challenges to address the issue of linkage between resource governance and insecurity condition in Africa, since deficient resource governance often leads to poor state capacity, augment poverty and regional disparities as well as civil conflicts, which largely takes place in resource-rich countries (i.e. Nigeria, Democratic

Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau). However, the role of natural resource in originating political contestation and violence between the centre, peripheries and mineral productive areas in these countries is visible. So far, several policies, strategies and institutions which have been carried out by African governments towards resource governance in a country have failed to attain proficient governance form of available resources, minerals in particular. Thus, in this paper the author aims to investigate two main objectives to address issue of resource governance and fragile condition in Africa resource-rich countries, and to accomplish its goal. First off, the paper attempts to introduce the relationship between deficient resource governance, rising poverty, corruption and violence in numerous cases. Second, it offers a proposed conceptual model entitled Resource Security Sector Reform (RSSR), as an appropriate approach to reform resource sector, develop governance system and place economic growth and mitigate conflicts as well, in many mineral-rich countries in Arica . The paper therefore, endeavours to develop the understanding relating to the association between natural resources (i.e. minerals) and political security as well as identifying the structural and functional origins of reform in Africa's mineral sector.

Method and Material

This paper uses a qualitative research method via content technique, an appropriate technique for gathering and analyzing data which collected from different sources (e.g. primary and secondary). In this work the author is highly reliant on secondary data, mainly literature related to resource conflict, security and governance issue (i.e. research articles). The whole data contented in an explanatory way to questioning the robust relation between resource governance, political security and conflicts in Africa resource-rich countries.

Some literature Review

Literature regarding the relationship between natural resources (i.e. minerals) and insecurity condition in Africa is large. The concentration on such issue has emerged since early 1990s when scholars began to focus on the effect of natural resources on the link between deficient resource governance, poverty and civil conflicts within African countries, this demonstrates work for example of (Asamoah 2013;

Alao 2015; Kabemba, 2014 and Billon 2010). However, scholars' examination on the nexus of natural resources and civil conflicts, insecurity, using variety of approaches and models ranging from quantitative to qualitative techniques which belong to different principles and theories in the field of social science. In addition, earlier global literature on this relationship presented the major works of, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and (Ross 2004), who they make a direct relationship between an economic factor and civil conflicts in resource-rich counties, they claim that resource abundance and being dependent on primary commodities and exports can lead to civil wars. Also they add the risk of war increases as the resource base and export increase, and risk reduces as the opportunity cost of rebellion increases; therefore, countries with rich resources such as minerals, timber and drug are vulnerable to civil war. Since rivalling parties in these countries aspire to advance their position and gain power through seizure of resources, conflict occurs when a state is weak or intentionally neglects other parties in the sharing of income generated from mineral export (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Moreover, Ross (2004) presents that "primary commodities increase the probability of civil war by enabling nascent rebel groups to raise money either by extracting and selling the commodities directly, or by extorting money from others who do". This typically illustrates the cases of civil wars in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra-Leone, where the rebels in these countries used revenue from diamond to finance their conflict with central government and even to enhance their private income (Billon, 2007 and Ross, 2004). This idea is also in conformity with much of existing literature on economic motivations of civil conflicts in African countries. This illustrates some of the influential works of, for example: (Jalloh 2013; Mahler, 2012 and Asamoah , 2013).

Alternatively, there is a group of literature, makes a link between unfair distribution of wealth among regions, neglecting the locals from benefiting from the generated wealth from their region, ethnic diversity and eruption of civil secessionist wars. Regarding these ideas, there are a number of the evidences and empirical findings which support this argument. For example, Deiwiks et al (2012) and Ross et al (2012) state that in resource-rich countries horizontal

inequalities between ethnic groups, regional grievances and inequality in the distribution and exploitation of natural resources, minerals in particular, will lead to civil conflicts and secession wars. Furthermore, Ross (2006) concludes that regional disparity, and neglecting local people to benefit from wealth of natural resources fuel civil conflicts, political instability and eventually rise claiming for secession in minerals countries. Specifically, Collier and Hoeffler (2012) state that oil has played a central role in ethnic tensions in Nigeria in the second half of the 1960s, tainted by the civil war in the oil-rich region of Biafra and claim via Igbo people who led the struggle to secession of Biafra from the rest of Nigeria. Another example of the role of mineral resource in ethnic- secession wars can be seen from the region of Katanga, in Democratic Republic of Congo. In this example, diamonds, cobalt and other minerals caused the civil conflict, when the diverse ethnicities launched a struggle against the central government for secession of the region (Billon 2007). Similar to Biafra in Nigeria, Leary (2007) states that when oil was discovered in 1970s in Sudan, it became the key factor behind the height of southern identity, when the southerners claim to secede and govern their oil-rich region.

Emphasizing the importance of relationship between ethnicity, wealth distribution and secession trends, Ross (2008) claims that the presence of mineral wealth and inequality in its distribution will enhance the likelihood of secession conflicts that are based on identity or ethnic background. In the view of that, Deiwi et al (2012) state that inadequate allocation of wealth in a diverse society will encourage secessionist wars. Furthermore, Sambanis and Milanovic (2011) provide that resource-rich and diverse territories are more likely to demand autonomy, due to unequal distribution of wealth in one country.

Table 1: Mineral Resources and Secessionist Movements in Africa and some Asian Countries

Country	Region	Duration	Mineral resources
Angola	Cabinda	1975-2004	Oil
Democratic Republic of Congo	Katanga/Shaba	1960-65	Copper
Indonesia	West Papua	1969- present	Copper and Gold
Indonesia	Aceh	1975- 2005	Natural gas
Morocco	West Sahara	1975-88	Phosphates and oil
Myanmar	Hill tribes	1983-95	Tin and gems
Nigeria	Biafra	1967-70	Oil
Papua new guinea	Bougainville	1988- 97	Copper and Gold
Sudan	South	1983-2004	Oil
Yemen	East and South	1994	Oil

Source: Ross (2008).

On the relationship between resources revenue and state capacity, some literature make a link between rent, poor institutions, inadequate policies and mal-distribution of resource revenue, for example, Zeynalov (2013); Couttenier and Soubeyran (2013) and Lohote (2012), have suggested that mineral resources abundance and influx of external rents generated from these resources hinder institutional, democratic development and economic growth; and thus, cause uneven distribution of public revenue and encourage civil conflicts in resource-rich countries as well. Likewise, Lundahl and Sjöholm (2006) state that countries those rely on rent from minerals such as oil tend to have a more corruption, unequal income distribution and poor institutions, and these poor institutions, mal-distribution of income explain almost all of the weak performance of the rentier state. De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) and Schwarz (2008) summarize that rent has multiple effects on country that depends on mineral revenue and such effects directly influence economic, governance effectiveness, and socioeconomic development. Nour (2009) and Gadkarim (2010) specify that in Sudan, state-centered oil management, high dependence on oil revenue, and lack of economic diversification, declining economy and growth in other production sectors also have greater stakes to conflict.

A review of the preceding literature develops a reasonable opinion regarding the relationship between mineral revenue, weak state, institutions and development. Hence the author supports ideas of Schwarz (2008); Lundahl and Sjöholm (2006) and Gadkarim (2010) because they match reality. However, rent generated from mineral resources can lead to state fragility, weak governance system and lack of institutions capacity, when a state greatly relies on external revenue and overlooks other sectors that can also contribute to the generation of the wealth, such as industrial and agricultural sectors. This situation presents the main reasons behind the resource endowment difficulties and one of them is the Dutch disease. Moreover, one may anticipate the collapse of mineral sector that a country relies on may lead to political instability. This of course, hinders a state's capacity in responding to its citizens' needs. Whenever this occurs, ethnic and regional tensions, and violent conflicts which are often fuelled by instability in resources wealth will take place. This can be seen as in the case of the secession of south region and suspension of oil production in Sudan.

On the hand, type of regime, legitimacy, degree of institutionalization and transparency are critical features to determine a distributive capacity of rentier state. In this topic, Mähler (2010) clarifies that a rentier state is typically characterized as authoritarian, weak institutions and state capacity as well as economically inefficient. Moreover, Hendrix (2010) suggests that democracy is associated with higher rational legitimacy and, therefore, higher state capacity. However, a rentier state often develops into autocratic-authoritarian regime nature and, therefore, lowers state capacity. According to Alao (2007) and Koning (2008) the control of rent by central bureaucracies, weak institutions and lack of transparency are inherited from totalitarian regimes and political corruption in oil rich countries worldwide. Ikejiaku (2009) verifies that among all factors that hamper government efficiency, hinder growth, democracy, and contribute to the onset of civil war, authoritarian regime nature and political corruption are the most compelling, as in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. In interesting way, some literature link between political corruption, establish patronage networks and use of rent from minerals, as Gervasoni (2010) notes that, "rents allow officials to buy public

support and build patronage networks, which in turn stunt the development of available opposition and related democratic institutions”. In most oil-rich countries, political elites use the rent of mineral to establish patronage network to gain personal benefits and defend their interests instead of spending them on services and development of the people of a state (The World Bank 2012). In addition, Winter (2013) states that patronage system, political corruption and neglecting the right of minorities pillar, politician power and authoritarian regime, thus impeding real democratization in oil-rich country of Azerbaijan. In regard to Africa’s political aspect, Basedau & Lacher (2006) cite that in West Africa region, specially, in the Gabon; oil money fuels networks of patronage, providing political support for president Omer Bongo, who has ruled the country since 1967.

From the review of above literature, it appears that there is a rich literature in the area of association between resource governance, distribution and utilization and political insecurity condition (e.g. conflicts and governance deficiency) in developing world, particularly in African countries. However, the main outcome of these literature exemplify complexity of the issue, and it seems difficult to link it only with resource abundance, economic growth and income factors as demonstrated by most economists’ examination of the issue. However, there are always many other active factors such as political, institutional and societal involved and directly affect the onset of many civil and resource conflicts in Africa. Thus, it is essential to engage this issue in a broad security analysis, to be understood and viewed mostly from a political security perspective. As a result, the present paper, attempts to fill the gap in this literature and extend knowledge on the issue, by determine structural and functional factors that caused natural resources to contribute to political turmoil and insecurity condition in Africa resources –rich countries, this done by developing of a conceptual model that links between reforming of governance system and resource sector as outlined from security sector reform model. This will be discussed in details.

Setting of the Scene

Today, in Africa, resource-rich countries have experienced comparatively range levels of resource conflicts, which often fragile

states due to the dispute among groups and between a central governments and regions over access, control and govern these resources. This in turns has made Africa as a scene of much bloodiness conflicts over mineral resources, particularly during last three decades. However, from oil in Nigeria and Sudan and diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the politics surrounding control and govern of natural resources has disrupted security of states and communities alike, moreover, increased external intervention in these countries as well. Over years, the concentration of authority over the natural resources (e.g. oil), poor governance, distribution of these resources and their generated wealth, poor negotiated contracts and weakly regulated integration of governing resource sector, have led to persistent contestation between different, tries of governance in an African country, weaken state's capacity and increase corruption in addition to augment poverty, mal-development, and thus trigger off conflicts in the continent. Such conflicts have the potential to impact natural resources beneficiary at both national and local levels of one country. Even though, many of African countries are blessed with natural resources (i.e. oil, diamonds, cobalt, copper, uranium, silver, bauxite), unfortunately poverty mal-development, regional disparities, and also standard of living of many people in Africa are deplorable. Nowadays, poverty in arising in African and most abundant resource- countries are still poor. This largely is due to the resource governance and balanced development process in many resources abundant- countries in Africa always reveal unfulfilled secured and advantage to its people, in terms of alleviating poverty and regional equality. Moreover, they have led to augment poverty and slow the countries' economic growth, which stands as the main reason for figuring countries such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo DRC, Liberia, and Guinea Bissau, Central Africa Republic are among the top 25 poorest countries in Africa (Beegle et al, 2016).

On the other hand, corruption, mainly political and administration one, has become deeply enhanced in most of minerals countries. Thus far, politician, and high- ranking officials are involved in range of corruption activities. Countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Libya, south Sudan and Chad, are considered as high-

ranking corrupted countries in the Africa and the world. Weak rule of law, lack of transparency, accountability in mineral sector (e.g. oil) and systematic corruption, marginalized economic activities in these countries, hindering economic growth, cause underdevelopment and increase poverty as well. However, revenue from minerals resources, mainly oil, is not spent responsibly, much of these revenues is often spent on security apparatus and strengthens the patronage network which support African leaders to stay long in power as the case of Gabon (Basedau and Lacher, 2006).

Regarding allocation of wealth generated from minerals resources such as oil, between upper and lower levels of a state, such a matter is highly becomes a source of originating political contestation between the centre and regions of one country. Basically, in many of resource abundant- countries including Sudan, the allocation of resource revenues has not produced any noticeable positive outcome. Ever, centralized governance system, severe corruption, lack of appropriate criteria, institutions to govern, distribute such revenues, in addition to deficiency of governments to develop fair distribution of resource revenues among regions and people, have all cited as key factors causing deficiency of resource governance regional disparities and thus, triggering, escalating competition and conflict between rivals (e.g. central government, regions and rebels).

This typically illustrates the cases of Nigeria and Sudan. In the case of Sudan, often poor management of natural resources and their uneven distribution had turned mineral resources, such as oil, into civil conflicts and promote secession trends in the country (Li, 2013 and Morelli and Rohner, 2010). While, Nigeria's oil-rich southern delta region has been the scene of repeated armed clashes between local people and federal government and its military force, the unrest has been stoked by popular frustrations over poverty and claim over redistribution of oil revenue between the federal government and country's main export sector (Harsch, 2007). unfair allocation of revenues between different tiers of governance, not only frustrated local people, but also weakened governance functions, specially at local levels, where these institutions were found poor, inefficient in terms of carrying out their mandated responsibilities (e.g. providing public services), this is due to lack of self-finance at local levels, the

states' governments have become directly dependent on central subsidies to perform their responsibilities, risking losing their autonomy as cases from many federal state, particularly Sudan (Suleiman, 2008 and El-zain, 2011).

In addition to unfair allocation of resource revenues between upper and lower levels of a resource –rich country, deficient of resource governance is also linked to issue of less economic growth and worse development. So far, in many sub-Saharan African resources –rich countries (Nigeria, Gabon and Mozambique), natural resources tend to be an economic curse than a blessing. This hypothesized to happen for many different reasons, including decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors, especially the agricultural, services, labour market and manufacturing sectors, due to countries' over-reliance on only minerals as the main source of growth and discourage the non-mineral sectors. This largely caused a phenomenon known as Dutch disease, volatility of revenue from the natural resource sector due to exposure to global commodity market swings, government mismanagement of resources, or weak ineffectual, unstable or corrupt institutions (possibly due to the easily diverted actual or anticipated revenue stream from extractive activities (Sachs and Warner, 2009). The entire often lead to contestation between centre and regions of one state, moreover, encouraging local people to use violence as a means to seize control over rich central areas and change the system at large.

Alternatively, issue of deficient resource governance and distribution, is also causes destabilize, deficiency of a state capacity as well as civil wars. However, in Africa, weak governance occurs when a discovered mineral resource has a negative impact on governance and institutions performance, due to sever of political corruption in mineral sector, lack of accountability and rule of law (Collier and Venables, 2010). Often poor execrative sector governance originated of low revenue transparency and weak regulatory institutions, this in turn cause state fragility in terms of failed to govern its available resources, distribute their generated wealth, and thus resources driven conflict and political crises (Ushie, 2013). This is because; weak institutions may explain poor performance of minerals-rich states, oil-

rich countries such Angola and Nigeria, diamonds rich Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, are well examples.

In sum, countries with weak governance, and rich with natural resources are prone to state fragility, poor governance performance and armed conflicts. Nevertheless, in Africa, issue of resource governance is typically grows to be considered political phenomenon. Control, govern and access to abundant natural resources and their revenues have profound effects on governance and the politicization of security sector of one country. Thus, in line below, the author, endeavors to offer an appropriate conceptual model that considers a comprehensive account of the linkage between natural resources, governance reform and security matter in Africa' resource rich- countries, particularly sub-Saharan countries and Sudan, this in order to place a reform on resource sector and mitigate resource based conflict in these countries.

Conceptualization of Resource Security Sector Reform (RSSR):

Resource Security Sector Reform (RSSR) is a conceptual model designed to map and assess natural resource sector capabilities and gap and or to improve resource governance in fragile situation such as Nigeria, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. The model is designed to be used in combination with other concepts, resource governance, governance institutions, functions and conflict mitigation. Since deficient resource governance in resource- rich countries becomes a source of political turmoil between the state, entire regions and ethnic groups, or financing these conflicts in one country. This model therefore, undertake to strengthen resource governance, respond to instability or threat caused by natural resources (i.e. violent conflict), or restore governance following conflict over natural resources in a country, especially in Sub-Saharan region. In theory, since the end of cold war and changing in traditional wars between or within states, elsewhere, especially in developing world, the role of natural resources in driving conflicts and instability is becoming visible. This fact has established in the majority of literature related to civil conflict and insecurity condition in a country (Besada 2013 and Grasa and Mateos 2011). However, "literature on resource curse and paradox of plenty established strong linkage between resource abundance and corruption, authoritarianism; economic decline; inequality; and violent conflicts" (Besada 2013). Abundant in mineral

resources such as oil, diamond and cobalt in particular, provides both finances, motive of armed conflicts (i.e. greed and grievance) and determine the duration of civil conflict as well as encourage secession trends in resource-rich countries (Ross 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Billion 2007).

In addition, in resource abundant countries, rent-seeking behavior affects the economic structure, political framework, institutional setting and power relations within a country, particularly where patronage prevails (Bilal 2013). Based on this thinking on the relationship between resource abundance, economic decline and conflict, it seems that deficiency of resource governance is the reason behind natural resources that fuel conflict in a country. However, poor governance and processes related to natural resources create a gap in resource governance, by failing to translate abundant resource of a country (e.g. Nigeria and Sierra Leone) into wealth to reduce poverty and regional inequality. This gap result in natural resources, especially minerals borne threat and disruption of resource sector lead to internal conflicts and instability, particularly for fragile states threatened by violent conflicts such as Sudan. Since often lack to rule of law, raise of public corruption and poor economic policies may increase vulnerability of resource conflict that causes political turmoil in a country. Thus, in order to address issue of resource governance and related conflict in Africa, the issue should be linked to the concept of political and security governance reform sectors, so as to determine political, functional and structural origins of such correlation, more discussion in line below.

What is the Resource Sector Security Reform (RSSR)?

RSSR is an element of security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR is a comprehensive process linking state and non-state actors, military, civilian and public-private actors in the form of security, governance and development nexus (Ryan 2011). It focuses on conflict mitigation, and long-lasting peace in war-ridden regions, state building in transitional, fragile situations. "The objective of SSR is to institutionalize a professional security sector that is effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn to protect" (Sandoz 2012). Recent work on security sector reform has identified the interdependent nature of governance, security sector reforms,

institutions capacity building , conflict mitigation and peace building. Thus its a holistic political process that involves both security institutions (i.e. armed and police forces), government and non-government institutions, private bodies, this, in order to strengthen security and address governance issue in delicate situation (Sandoz 2012). As with SSR, the principal objective of RSSR is to improve governance system, functions, improve resource sector and increase wealth accessibility to citizens in an Africa' resource-rich country. It addresses security challenges that arise from resource conflict and related political disorder, which hinder a country to achieve peace and stability for decades. However, in the absence of effective resource governance that manages, secures and mitigates conflict over natural resources, the ability to govern a country's natural resources will reduce and insecurity condition arising from resource conflict will increase. Thus, resource security sector reform aims to address security challenges that occur as a result of poor governance and processes related to natural resource sector in one African's resource- rich country.

Basically, the model divides and organizes elements of resource security into two levels structure (i.e governance form) and functions (i.e. resource governance and resource institutions and regulations). Structure and functions related activities are correspondent to particular actors, institutions as the roles, responsibilities related to govern and distribution of resource wealth are incorporated between stakeholders (e.g. governance tiers, governance institutions, and private entities). Structural and functional areas are used to describe key areas of activities required for secure and prosperous resource sector of a country. The model outlines structure and functions as follows:

Governance Form (the Multi-Levels Governance MLGs an Approach to Governance Reform and RSSR)


Multi-Levels Governance (MLGs) is a governance reform process, a subset of security sector reform (SSR). In addition to reform security sector and build peace in fragile conditions such as Congo Democratic, Liberia and Sierra Leone, SSR focuses on state building, security governance, development and equality among people within a state territory (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, 2004 b). Therefore, its a political process that centres on political, governance and institutional reforms, which provide security, peace and welfare as well as public good to citizens of a country (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000). As a component of SSR, MLGs is a multifaceted process targeting the improvement of governance in transitional societies. It intends reforms in institutions, organizations and legislations, which determine the governance system and addresses the factors that threaten the state and its people (Charbit 2011; Penone 2010 and Conzelman 2008). The main features of MLGs are the development of public sector, transformation in institutions and improving participation as well as strengthening good governance (Kozak 2012 and Kulshreshtha, 2008).

In terms of institutional transformation and participation, Multi-Level Governance (MLG) is a means to increase devolution through the sharing of power between government's tiers; establishment of local institutions, and increase local communities' participation in decision making; in addition to the capability of private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Andrews and Shah, 2003). According to Charbit (2011), Multi-Level Governance creates a degree of autonomy in the local units with the cooperation between upper and lower levels of government. Furthermore, it ensures revenue sharing and provides lower levels with fiscal ability to perform duties, and thus, develop governance and institution's response capacity (Allain-Dupré, 2011). Within Multi-Level Governance, a merit role that can be played by private sector is stemmed from their engagement in local development, service delivery and support increase of accountability, transparency in the resource sector; as all public and private sectors should be governed by law and good governance principles (Bilal, 2013). Thus, as structural element of RSSR, the MLG, is therefore set out to deal with resources insecurity issues (i.e. centralized resource governance, mal-development and unfair distribution of wealth). Since the distribution of power and wealth between upper and lower levels of governance can meet these gaps in resource governance area. Moreover, applying of principles of good governance, such as rule of law, accountability and transparency in MLGs form will improve resource governance and combat corruption in public and private entities related to resource sector.

In functional area, RSSR sets three sub-functions including; resource governance and security, resource institutions and regulations and community development enterprises. Each of these functions that form the model have their own value on the resource sector, they also interact with other functions and directly affect resource sector. These functions display as follows:

Figure1: RSSR Functional Area



Source: Prepared by the author.

a. Resource Governance

Recently, especially in Africa-developing countries, increased emphasis on resource governance and security is growing critical importance as an instrument of political and economic development in these countries. Since deficiency on resource governance has led to rising of political turmoil and economic decline in resource-rich countries. However, recent history is evidence of the fact that poor resource management could result in chaotic wasteful development of human capital, the depletion of natural resources on which societies' economic livelihoods are based, and in extreme cases, violence and political instability at both national and regional level (Buckles 1999 cited in Besada, 2013). Thus, efficient resource governance helps the state to improve the resource sector conditions that contribute to their citizens' quality of life, economic growth and alleviate the onset of civil conflicts caused by natural resources, as in the case of Sub-Saharan countries. In terms of definition, the concept of resource governance is distinct from the notion resource management, although the two concepts are usually used equally, "While natural resource management is concerned with how human population interact with the natural landscape, natural resource governance addresses the structures and institutions that determine these functions" (Ushie 2013). Thus, natural resource governance refers to principle, process and practice of mainstreams resources and distribution issues and concerns in policies, institutions and regulations and actual actions in different levels including national and local level, within a good governance framework (Upreti 2004). In the case of resource conflict in many Africa countries including Sudan, addressing natural resource governance reform as part of a political reform can help to benefit from available natural resources, which could be the key to poverty alleviation, increase national wealth, regional equity and conflict mitigation.

b. Resource Security

The natural resource realm can be a risky place. In addition to hamper economic growth, governance efficiency is commonly referred to as the resources curse in the literature, which examined resource abundance and conflict nexus in one country. Additional potential dangers rise from natural resource related corruption, totalitarianism

regional inequality; and violent conflict. Therefore, a set of processes and reforms towards security of natural resource is required in order to take advantages of these resources and bring stability in resource conflict countries. Generally, resource security refers to a multiple and incorporated system to acquire sufficient contribution of natural resources in all areas of production, life and consumption, moreover, protecting natural resources from damage through policies which relate to natural resources utilization (Yulong and Hong, 2010). In other words, resource security is a collective of activities including the managing, regulating, monitoring, reviewing and reforming of the natural resource sector (The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007). Thus, resource security necessitates the presence of a set of institutions, policy and technologies that sustain governance of natural resources (Agrawal, 2001). Essentially, resource security entails governance reform and public participation. As Bannon and Collier (2003) state resource security is a part of broad process that targets political reform and establishment of highly transparent governance which secures fair distribution of resource revenue in a country. Hence, it involves, presence of transparent, accountable and effective management of natural resources, to assure sustainability of the available resources in a country through building capacity of a government and civil society' institutions (The United Nations 2006).

Alternatively, resource security and decentralized natural resources are widely used interchangeably, however, "decentralized natural resources policies target finding of institutional design and decentralization reform of the natural resources sector as well as political incentives to local politicians to engage in natural resource management" (Andersson et al 2004). In addition, Lockwood (2010) states that resource security forms a multi-level governance of resources through decentralized-democratic and efficient institutions to address issues that are related to the usage benefit and access to natural resources in a country. Therefore, resource security seems to be a model of participation that leads to transfer of natural resource regulations from the central government to local groups and institutions, and efficiently secures the property rights of resource users (Adhikari 2002). Likewise, Ribot (2003) adds that decentralization of natural resources precedes the principles of power sharing and

enhances localized management of natural resources. Based on the above opinions of resource security, a common consensus is that resource security is critically important to sustain governance of natural resources in a resource rich- country; entails decentralized natural resource policies, institutions and empower locals' roles on resource governance. This in turn can help to understand the prevalence or absence of violence conflict over natural resources both at national or lower levels of a state, especially in the case of sub-Saharan African countries.

c. Resource Institutions and Regulations:

One of the immediate challenges facing the Africa' resource- rich countries is deficiency of governance institutions and regulations related to natural resources; such poor institutions is an issue that often undermines governance distributive capacity of resource wealth that leads to political turmoil in these countries. In different cases, namely, in countries with weak institutions, resource abundance, and resource discoveries might lead to revolution and rising of violence (Cabrales and Hauk 2011). Moreover, weak institutions may also hamper economic growth and translation of available natural resources of a country into wealth, which may contribute in alleviating poverty and combating public corruption in resource sector (Wegenast 2013; Elbadawi and Soto 2013 and Lhote 2012). In this light, resource institutional and regulations reforms appear as an endeavor to avoid many aspects of resource governance deficiency in resource-rich countries. Such institutional reform is becoming an important part of governance and policy making agenda that should be fairer, more transparent, and more inclusive in order to promote resource governance, sustainable and peaceful development elsewhere (Bulte and Brunnschweiler 2012). Moreover, institutions and regulations reform is prerequisite to protect natural resources from damages, allocate their wealth among a state's citizens and settle conflict over these resource as well. Essentially, "institutional reform should empower the poor by capacity building for public services, providing economic opportunities and security" (Campbell et al 2004). Likewise, the implementation of suitable policies and institutions can contribute to sustainability, resilience of natural resource systems and poverty alleviation (Charles 2004 and Clemen and Amezaga 2013). The


experience of resource conflict and related instability in Angola and Sierra—Leone may greater strong incentive for governance group and policy makers to secure effective governing, resource institutions and regulations so as to manage competitive resources (e.g. minerals). However, the link between such institutional reform, efficient resource governance and conflict mitigation is essential to restore political stability in these countries.

d- Public Private Partnership (PPP) Framework :

In fragile, poor governance and transitional conditions of a country, the Public- Private Partnership (PPP) is an increasingly popular choice for a state in supporting sustainable economic development and contributes to peace and political stability. “Such PPP arrangements were driven by limitation in public funds to cover investments needs but also by efforts to increase the quality and efficiency of public services” (The European Commission 2003). In fact, inclusive approach to the governance of natural resources in fragile situations such as Liberia, DRC, Sierra-Leone and Liberia entails the involvement of private and foreign investment sector to solve some deficiency areas related to service delivery; economic growth; poverty reduction and building infrastructure of a country. “Greater accountability and corporate social responsibility; the re-investment of resource revenue into social services and poverty reduction, and diversified economic development constitute clear objectives for all stakeholders” (Besada 2013). For economic growth the government needs to engage with private sector in a number of activities including medium and large enterprises (e.g. productive projects) to support growth and provide basic needs through PPP framework (The Ministry of finance, India 2011). Reconstruction activities in post-conflict, poor communities are also areas of concern in PPP framework. However, in most cases, particularly in Africa, including Sudan, countries emerging from conflict have lack of some important divers of growth, poverty reduction and reconstruction of infrastructures, this due to lack of adequate public revenues, government capacity, and investor interest (The PPIAF 2011a). A creation of strong PPPs framework is critically important in order to cover these shortages. These include for example, rebuilding the road

network, encouraging formation of Small-scale irrigation and water infrastructure in rural areas, and improving markets and building institutions capacity (The PPIAF 2011 b). Though, to ensure successful implementation of CSR and rebuilding projects drawing from PPP model, “founding of good governance, commitment of the public and private sectors, favorable legal framework, sound economic policy and availability of finance market are the top five critical success factors for PPP in a country” (Ismail and Ajija 2011). All these factors form a broad framework of likely public –private partnership, which are guided by the rule of law, effective and efficient, accountable and transparent institutions. However, deficiency of effective public and private sector’ institutions has a potential to support the development of resource sector, secure basic needs in poor communities and alleviate socio-economic factors that contribute to fuel conflict in a country.

In sum, these functions drawing from resource security sector reform conceptual model are designed to apply at every level of government; both national and local levels, with incorporate, mutual roles in order to promote resource governance in poor governing system, poor governing institutions, regulations that are related to natural resources as in many resource –rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, these functions illustrate in broad terms the core responsibilities of national-local public institutions that effect resource governance, security, including enforcing legislations and policies related to resource management and distributions in a country.

Figure 2: Resource Security Sector Reform RSSR

Source: Created by the author.

Following the depiction of RSSR's nature, structural and functional areas, it's worth mentioning that, RSSR is an integrated system that can be used those same functions and means at national and lower levels of a government, particularly it is applying within a multi-level governance system and also involving role and function of private sector. It's intended to be integrated in nature for that purpose is designed at a level of generality to be used for multiple goals related to resource governance and security. Below is a brief explanation of possible actors and responsibilities in a broad form of RSSR.

Table 2: Actors and Responsibilities in RSSR Form

Typology	Actor	Responsibilities
National government	National –levels leaders and senior legislative and executive members and institutions	Establish national and strategic policy, legislations that regulate and protect natural resources in a country
Regional governments	Regional institutions and staff	Share the national government on policy and decision- making, found localized policy and regulate sub-national institutions in relation to resource sector
PPP	Public and Private agencies	Enhance public administration, building institution and community development

Source: created by: author.

Based on the above table, RSSR form entails a focus on a range of actors, process and responsibilities; to govern, secure natural resources in efficient way so as to mitigate unsafe condition caused by resource conflict in a country, such as Angola, Nigeria, DRC and Sudan. Therefore, it represents a correlation between governance type and function and resource governance in a given country, where such interrelation is a component of security sector reform and political security at large. However, multi-level governance, which is developed out of governance reform, is addressing the issue of resource sector reform through the development of elements of devolution, good governance and effective institutions at national and sub-national levels. In many African resource-rich countries (i.e. West African countries), the centralized, totalitarian governance type has long been unsuccessful to manage the natural resources (i.e. minerals) and their wealth in a good manner. However, lack to rule of law, in-adequate policies and institutions as well as sever public corruption in resource sector, have all undermined fair distribution of resource wealth among communities, balanced development and regional equity in Africa. Thus, results in making natural resources into one of the causes of

conflicts and security threat in a country. In this complexity, RSSR in focus has the same concepts of political security and security governance sector reform, as it centres on governance reform, resource sector reform and institutions building, and also reduction of causes that lead to conflicts in Africa. It therefore:

1. Incorporates processes taken, in state capacity building process, to improve poor institutions and policies related to the resource sector in transitional and war-torn Africa resource-rich countries.
2. Involves all governance levels in a state to identify and address natural resources issue through multi-levels approach that defines the integration and involvement of different tiers of government.
3. Strengthen good governance, public participation and legislation reform to respond to a specific threat or restore governance following conflict over natural resources.
4. Ensure the role of private sector and economic partners, namely “corporations” in resource governance through development perspective.

Policy Implications

In this paper, policy implications of Resource Security Sector Reform RSSR, a model that proposes to applying in fragile conditions in many of resource -rich country. Purposely, such model is anticipating a framework ranging out of a number of institutions and legislations process to govern natural resources and distribute their generated wealth effectively in the future. Accordingly, these recommended policies are presented as follows:

1. Building up of resource governance should be originated from a border policy reform initiated by new authorized democratic regime to change political and socio-economic structure of a country to realize equity in power, wealth development and political order.
2. In essence, the decentralization system provides an appropriate formula for achieving balanced participation, local autonomy, power of resource and equitable allocation of wealth. And thus, it reduces gaps between the regions and tiers of government, practically this will be fulfilled through:

- ✓ The present position of division of power in relating to natural resources should be enhanced.
 - ✓ The presence of integrated management of resource between a region and centre on high contested resource such as oil, gold and copper must be arranged.
 - ✓ The present centre-state fiscal relationship must tend to empower a state's ability to utilize local resource for purpose of development at state level.
 - ✓ The presence of national constitutional institutions to distribute wealth between regions based on consent equitable criteria.
 - ✓ The present national strategy of development, regional disparities and needs of the affected areas should be considered.
3. Reform on system of legislation and constitution is essential to be updated with the proposed devolution system. Moreover, this reflects the allocation of power between different tiers of government and safeguards the maintenance of good balance in devolution system by limiting each level of government to its jurisdiction domain and preventing contradiction. This will develop governance efficiency in terms of resource management and service delivery.
 4. Moreover, laws and institutions should be reformed to equally develop, protect and regulate the use of resource and advance of them both at national and local levels. A priority then, may be given to the presence of national deliberate strategy that intends to increase local, foreign investments, to develop unexploited mineral, agricultural and forest resources of a country, and to generate considerable wealth that supports speed balanced growth and alleviates poverty if equally distributed.

Conclusion

This paper recommended RSSR provisions as the adequate model likely to reform mineral-resource sector, develop fragile situations and restore instability in Africa resource-rich countries. Issue of deficient resource governance repeatedly is being seen as main source of uneven distribution of national wealth, regional disparities and augment poverty as well as weaken state capacity in many of minerals countries

of Africa as exemplified above. Therefore, to secure efficient resource governance, better utilization of these available resources, structural and functional reform drawing from multi-levels governance and public sector reform that related to resource security is essential to reach optimal resource governance in one country. However, provisions of constitutional, institutional and regulations reform remain key factors to empower distribution of power and wealth between the centre and regions following establishment of a multi-levels governance system. In addition, multi-levels and good governance incorporates resource governance and security as prerequisites for putting an end to major root- cause of civil political conflict in current Africa through peaceful means.

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